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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the financial crisis of 2008 and the resulting government inte.rvention 
of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or more: generally called "the bailout." Beginning with 
historical context of past interventions, it sets forth an understanding of the economic 
environment of2008. After explaining the mechanics ofthe financial crisis, it proposes that the 
reinsurance products underlying the financial markets in 2008 were based on unsound 
accounting and risk management principles. Based on this proposition, the representational 
faithfulnc$s and fairness of mark-to-market accounting principles an~ examine.d. The paper 
concludes that a short-term financial focus is largely to blame for the crisis. while the 
government bailout intervention itself was helpful in remediating the adverse situation. 
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Introduction 
During a five month period from October. 2008 through February. 2009. Congress passed 
and the President signed into law t\vo controversial and unusual legislative tomes. First. the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008, became law on October 3, 2008. Second, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 was passed on February 17,2009. The purpose ofTARP was to prevent the collapse ofthe 
U.S. financial markets. The Recovery Act provided appropriations for a variety of economic 
stimulus activity, especially through creation of employment. 
The focus of this paper is on the financial crisis of 2008 and the resulting government 
intervention intended to reclaim the economy through stabilizing the financial markets. Thus. the 
TARP bailout is the primary intervention to be considered. The subsequent intervention of the 
Federal Reserve and the l lnitcd States Treasury, among other entities. in the U.S. financial 
markets represented the application of a controversial economic idea: that the government can 
successfully step in to stave ofT the collapse of financial markets and institutions with a bailout. 
Is this idea correct? 
While the measures of the bailout's success arc subjective. a conclusion can still be 
reached. This is especially true \\·ith the benefit of nearly four years to help analyze and 
understand economic changes. This paper concludes that the bailout has done more to hc.lp the 
economy as a whole than to hurt it. Certainly. mistakes were made in the execution of the 
government intervention. However, on the whole. both Main Street and Wall Street have 
benefitted from TARP and the outcropping interventions that were executed. 
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These statements do not mean that the underlying problem has been solved. On the 
contrary, the financial crisis of 2008 has shO\vn that the short-term focus of U.S. financial 
markets and institutions can have disastrous consequences. It is this short-term focus that is the 
root cause. While the economy has moved beyond imminent financial collapse with the bailout's 
help. the causational obsession with the short-term still remains. If the reader gains one point 
from this paper. let it be this: 
All i11ordi11ate focus 011 the .\llort-term is fimmcial suicit/1!. 
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Part 1: Histor·ical Background 
Placing an c~onomic event in historical sequence is challenging. Clearly classifying 
historical events as causational factors or as events that result from these factors is an important 
distinction. Determining whether market behavior subsequent to an economic crisis has been 
changed to a statistically significant level is di1licult because economics tracks a continual flow 
(the production and consumption choices of society and individuals) rather than a series of 
unrelated, isolated events. Thus, there arc t\\"O possible outcomes of historical examination. It is 
possible that historical events such as the Great Depression and the Savings and Loans crisis arc 
merely resurfacing in a new form "ith the onslaught of bank failures and the economic 
contraction like that of 2007-present. Otherwise, one may hold that the current economic 
situation bears no relationship other than great similarity with events of the past. ln this case. the 
economic flow no more connects particular events than a rug connects the furniture sitting on it. 
Nevertheless. similarity alone can bring great lessons. Therefore. a thorough examination of 
events leading up to the current bailout should prove essential to gaining a grasp of our current 
state of economic rescue atTairs. 
The Great Depression was a turning point toward our modem economy. After the stock 
market crash of 1929. free markets lost much of their omnipotent status as self-regulators. 
Government spending intervention. according to the theories of John Maynard Keynes. began to 
be considered ncccptable. if not essential, during times of severe economic slowdown. During 
the Depression, the Dow Jones Industrial Average tdl 89% <.md unemployment reached 25%. 
l'his makes today·s levels look like an economic boom. Could these levels be reached again? 
Experts diller in opinion: 
9ll'agc 
-rroday's cn"s1s] is similar {to the Depression] m that it's a wortdwtde crtsts and there are many 
fmancial mstJtut10ns in deep trouble. In the 1930s. 1930 to '33, we lost somethmg ltke 7, 000 or 
8.000 banks We have the potential to do something like that now. but I t11ink we're going to avoid 
it." -Richard Sylla, New York Un1vers1ty 
HThe world has looked at us for years as the pioneers of financial engineering ... Suddenly 
it looks ltke not only did we overstep. but we can't even sustain that system. We're going to close 
that system down. That would seem to me to be a huge, huge change in Amenca's economtc 
position in the world"- Paul Solman. NewsHour correspondent [77) 
As the U.S. economy was continuing to languish under President Hoover's administration 
in 1930 and 1931, Franklin Roosevelt successfully campaigned on the Keynesian public works 
spending platfom1 of the New Deal. In today's crisis, the U.S. government has chosen to traverse 
previously uncharted lengths of interventionism \'Vith its bailout legislation. This expedition is 
prompted by fear of murkcts being unable to save themselves. Similarly, Roosevelt intervened to 
an unprecedented level in his day through pouring money into public works: the Civilian 
Conservation Corps, the Tennessee Valley Authority. and the Works Progress Administration. 
These organizations increased employment by over 10% at a large taxpayer expense. [8] (9] (10] 
The most relevant Great Depression era entity for purposes of comparison with modem 
bailouts is probably the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). In 1932, Congress created 
the RFC with a starting grant of $500 million and authority to borrow up to $2 billion. The goal 
of the RFC legislation was .. 10 provide emergency financing facilities [a term referring to means 
of accessing bailout funds] for financial institutions~ to aid in financing agricuhure, commerce. 
and industry: to purchase preferred stock. capital notes. or debentures of banks and trust 
companies; and to make loans and allocations of its funds as prescribed by law." This mission 
was later enlarged to include general economic stabilization. In the end. around two thirds of the 
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RFC's money went to defense-related expenditures surrounding World War II. This has caused 
critics to contend that the RFC was eclipsed by the war efl'ort in economic impact. [8) [17) 
The RFC bears rcsemhlance to our curn:nt bailout. The $2 billion allocated is roughly 
equivalent to $31 billion today. However. this later grev.· to some $50 billion in the RFC's 25-
ycar life span as the organization's expectations w~rc expanded. The current bailout has heen 
expanded to include automakcrs and others. So too the RFC found itself serving more purposes 
than originally intended. How well did it serve its original purpose. stimulating liquidity in the 
economy and keeping hanks afloat? During the months immediately following the RFC's 
creation. puhlicly held currency and hank suspensions hoth decreased indicating a positive etrcct 
on banking. However, loans as a percentage of net bank deposits decreased from 92% to 57% 
from 1929 to 1935, indicating a freezing of liquidity. [7] [8] [ 11] [36] 
There arc three arguments against the RFC. First. it directed money not to consumers. hut 
to large institutions. The usc of public funds for a hai lout of a financial institution is rarely a 
popular action. Second, the RFC's eficct was mitigated by tax and tariff policies. It is important 
for government to avoid negating the effects of a bailout by failing to coordinate other area:- of 
policy. Third, open bookkeeping regulations demanded disclosure of institutions receiving aid. If 
an institution had to disclose to the public that it is seeking assistance due to insolvency. a run on 
that institution may occur. The problem of widespread distrust of the very institutions that were 
supposed to have hccn receiving assistance l:OUid have caused insolvency to hccome a self-
fultilling prophecy. 
In order to receive RFC assistance. an institution \\as required to allocate and segregate a 
certain amount of wllatcral to capitalize itsdf. These collateral requirements of the RFC' were 
controversial. On the one hand. this r~duccd taxpayer exposure to risk. hut on the other it took 
llll'age 
assets from banks with a limiting c!Tcct on liquidity. The JUT lasted around 25 years, being 
dissolved and distributed to various entities in 1957. Congress found extensive corruption in a 
closing investigation of the organization. In the end, the RFC's level of success is questionable ul 
best. Nonetheless, it remains a poignant example of the lender of last rcson. [7] 
Once a nation's economy has fallen hack on a lender of last resort, such lenders will likely 
be resurrected in some forn1 again in the future. A second example in U.S. history was the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), established in 1989 during the Savings and Loans Crisis. 
Federal deposit insurance. required of the S&Ls in 1934, has been cited as a factor leading up to 
the crisis. This insurance cost each S&L institution the same amount despite its individual degree 
ofrisk. This was "actuarially unsound.'' according to Ben Ely, an S&L expert. ll7} 
Ely points to a prohibition of adjustable-rate mortgages as well as limits on interest rates 
that S&Ls were allowed to charge as causes of the S&L Crisis. These factors did not allow S&Ls 
to charge sufficiently for their lending services and remain competitive. Fannie Mac and Freddie 
Mac themselves played a role, driving down interest rate!) on mortgages further with their 
publicly backed lending. When Paul Volckcr, Federal Reserve Chairman, tightened the money 
supply in 1979, interest rates soared. This left the heavily restricted S&L rates in the dust. and the 
industry declared losses of almost $9 billion in 1981 and 1982. The industry was insolvent. with 
the entire S&L industry portfolio of mortgages coming to a mere 15% of the industry's liabilities. 
[17][901 [91] 
Deregulation followed. causing the S&Ls to take even ""'ildcr risks. Accounting standards 
were lowered outrageously. with negative net worth sometimes being counted as "goodwitr· 
capital for firn1s. By the late I 980s, the problem remained unrcsol\'ed. The Federal Savings and 
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Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). which was responsible for insuring failing S&Ls in a 
similar manner to the FDIC insuring banks. was nearing bankruptcy itself. I 1 4] 
In 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery. and l:nforccmcnt 
Act (FIRREA) and arranged for around $50 billion to clean up the crisis, with a $30 billion long-
term bond issue and a Treasury funds appropriation. This action established the RTC and 
abolished the FSLIC. The RTC wus to operate for a limited time \\'ith congressional oversight 
and FDIC guidance. In its lifetime. the agency resolved some 747 S&Ls \\'orth around $394 
billion. Estimates for total costs of the cleanup and restructuring nm from $145 to $160 billion. 
Obviously. these costs an: cnom10us. but critics argue that the cost of not bringing forth the 
lender (or in this case, perhaps de postfacto insurer) of last resort \Vould be much greater. In 
2004. the U.S. boasted some 886 S&Ls with assets over $1.35 trillion. Washington Mutual. 
however, one of the largest S&L corporations with assets of $307 billion, has since gone 
bankrupt during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. [14] [90) [91] 
Despite one's opinion of the RTC. the path it took resembles the path of our current 
bailout. It was born in the midst of a crisis. It was somewhat rudimentary and greatly 
controversial. It acted quickly, because speed of response was critical to its mission. It used large 
sums of money to achieve what could have been the aversion of a banking collapse, or what 
could have been the perpetuation of a flawed industry. The similarity of our current economic 
recovery plan to the S&L Crisis recovery plan (or plans. depending on how one counts them) is 
fascinating, especially considering the proximity of the two events in history. 
What about other bailouts? ln U.S. history. smaller bailouts an.~ abundant, especially in 
the past century. Each typically focused on one particular company. with varying degrees of 
success. The Penn Central Railroad bailout of 1970 n:sultcd in a $3.2 billion taxpayer cost. but 
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produced the Conrail Corporation. In I 971, the government bailed out Lockheed to avoid job Joss 
and to maintain national defense and earned millions in loan fees. In 1975, the government bailed 
olll the City of New York with billions of dollars in loans. but all were successfully repaid. The 
I 974 bailout of Franklin National bank resulted in millions of dollars of unpaid interest and the 
partitioning of bank assets. The 1980 international bailout of Chrysler, in which the U.S. 
government participated. resulted in a profit of over $660 million. In the 1984 bailout of 
Continentallllinois National Bank and Tmst Company, the FDIC lost $1.8 billion. The 2001 
airline industry bailout through stock warrants and loans grossed a disputed profit of between 
$141.7 and $327 million dollars with a later loss of around $23.2 million. Success or failun: of 
these bailouts followed the RTC and RFC's pattern: hit or miss and highly disputed. It appears 
that there is no such thing in history as a bailout whose su~:ccss is universally lauded.[ 51 
Plainly the curr~nt recovery actions ar~ by no means the first example of bailout or lender 
oflast resort intervention in the U.S. economy. As such, there are obviously many lessons to he 
learned about our ~:urr~nt recovery actions from the past. While this section of this paper has 
demonstrated the precedents of our current TARP bailout. conclusions based on the similarity of 
our cum:nt economic recovery plan to the past will later follow. As this historical context has 
shown. government has not been shy in the past century about intervening when the financial 
markets struggle exceptionally. It is not fair to say that the intervention of 2008 is without 
comparison of scope or form. hut simply that it is unique to its own era of history. 
Whether one chooses to view the RTC as a success or not. the economy indisputably 
found the ability to move beyond the S&L Crisis. Financial markets were restored to health in 
the 1990s. Once again the economic cycle reached a boom period. In fact, that very boom had 
quite a lot to do with the financial crisis of 2008. 
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Part II: The 2008 Crisis 
Several precipitating factors of the ~urrcnt economic crisis and the bailout act merit 
consideration here. An understanding of where the market turmoil originated will aid an 
understanding of the bailout itself. Subprimc and so-called NINJA (No Income No Job 
Approved) lending practices. the real estate bubble crash. and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) 
arc all interconnected factors leading to the bailout. Perhaps the most often discussed issue is the 
securitization of mortgages into complicated investment instnnm:nts known as mortgage-backed 
securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and subsequent speculation on 
these complex securities. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). mark-to-market accounting 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. moral hazard and credit default swaps arc also worthy topics for 
ex<mlination. 
The average price of a U.S. home in November of2008 was 9% lower than just a year 
before. This historic drop signified an inherent malfunction in the housing market. The market 
had been overbid and now was experiencing an adjustment in value. Subprimc lending had 
skyrocketed, giving more people the means to purchase housing and bidding up prices. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the quasi-governmental agencies known as Government 
Sponsored Entities or GSEs. drove much of the subprime lending expansion. The GSFs \Vcrc 
required by law to meet strict govcmment requirements to lend large sums to low-income 
families and high-risk borrowers. who historically depend nwrc on subprime lending. The 
following chart illustrates the unsustainable increase in home prices experienced before the 
crisis. [2] [38] [83] 
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Another factor that many believe encouraged subprime lending was the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA). which was intended to help low-income or otherwise credit-
lacking communities. Such communities often experience liquidity shortages caused by their 
own hanks. Large state or national hanJ...s often set up branches to accept the deposits of these 
"less-than-prime" communities. In turn. they refrain from pumping the deposits back into local 
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loans but instead route them to more creditworthy large businesses and v<calthier community 
mortgage loans. While the CRA law had good intentions. many contend that it simply forced 
banks to make subprime loans and expose themselves to undue risk. At any rate. billions of 
dollars ofloans were made under the CRA. and it doubtless had influence in the subprime 
markets. These CRA loans made up a substantial portion of the portfolios ofthe GSEs Fannie 
Mac and Freddie Mac. The chart sho\\.11 below from CNBC illustrates the growth in prevalence 
of subprime mortgage lending. [23] f26 J [3 7 J [83 J 
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Of course. the more loans the mortgage lenders made. the more they could expand their 
market shares and grow their companies. even if the foundation for growth was inherently 
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unstable. Further. the subprime loans \\'ere driven by the surge in home-equity lines of credit. 
Home-refinance mortgages arc more often classified as subprimc than originating mortgage 
loans on home purchases. Some ofthese loans were made to borrowers with such great credit 
risk that one company even proudly coined the term ··NINJA loans·· to describe how freely it 
distributed credit. Although this term began as a positive marketing slogan. it was later used as a 
derogatory term to illustrate lack of good judgment on the part of creditors. The increase in 
mortgage debt outstanding in the U.S. was approximately $9.5 trillion over four years preceding 
the crisis. This rate of increase is unsustainable in simple terms of comparison to actual GDP. 
The only explanation for this inordinate increase is a lowering of borrowing standards. with a 
closely connected increase of uncrcditworthy borrowers willing to take on loans they cannot 
handle. [4] [26] 
Indeed. while subprimc lending allowed lenders to make more loans with relaxed 
standards, the rising popularity of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs} lured more borrowers with 
low introductory initial interest rates. As many ARMs age. they tend to adjust upward since they 
often carry a rate of interest higher than their initial rate. Further, ARMs arc tied to particular 
economic interest rate indices. As these indices adjust with the economy. the ARMs can adjust 
downward or dramatically upward. At one point, these ARMs and similar interest-only loans 
accounted for the majority of new home loans in the U.S. [ l) [ 3) [26] 
At the same time. the new mortgage boom was being securiti/.cd into bundled investment 
packages on bank balance sheets and investing entities. Loose lending practices and their 
potentially toxic. or insolvent, products, \>vcre being worked into the warp and woof of the U.S. 
banking system. Sccuriti1.ation involved tuming liquid ;md illiquid assds. like mortgages. into 
securities that could be bought and sold between large hanks and investors. Therefore, 
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homebuycrs often found themselves paying their mortgage paym~nts not dir~ctly to their local 
b;mks, but to large third-party banks that issued the securities and sold them in the secondary 
mortgage market to investors. The term ··collatcralil.ed debt obligations·· (CDOs} describes this 
style of asset-bucked security. with mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) being the most 
prominent form of mortgage investment in the pre-crisis market. [4][21] [22][30] 
Asset-backed securities outpaced in growth ull other types of bonds from 1996 to 2006. 
Securitized subprime mortgages alone increased by around I 000 percent in volume between 
1996 and 2006. Often, these securities wen: divided into levels of risk h<1scd on t:rcdit ratings and 
measures of likelihood of default. Each level of risk was called a "tranche.'" The first tranchcs 
were the most secure and represented the lirst payments on the mortgage. Since these payments 
v,;crc more certain rmd sooner. they fetched the highest prices. Later tranchcs \vcre sold for lower 
prices due to a higher risk of default and a greater time value of money. This system was a new 
way to deliver a mortgage to a financial market, so market participants had a hard time 
understanding and fairly pricing the new securities. Few questions \\We asked \\hen banks like 
AICi selling all the tranches of their new products. touted the security of mongagcs as being 
investment-grade. This tranche system to stratify risk led to a false sense of security and an 
overconfidence in measuring one of the most unpredictable phcnomenu in human history: risk of 
dcfuult. [4] [27] [79] 
Securitization marked a paradigm shift for everyone. especially for mortgage brokers. 
They found them sci\ cs making mortgages not to collect payments from their clients for years to 
come. but to sdl mortgages immediately to large investment house operations for instant cash. 
Their profits now derived not from a relationship, but from the point of sale of an impersonal 
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asset. The change of the local mortgage lender to middleman salesperson provided yet another 
incentive to sell mortgages to those who could not alTord them. 
As new securities hit the market. the growing real estate hubble began to be exposed to 
speculation on two fronts. By one point in 2005, housing prices had risen 12.5% during the 
previous year. This otTcrcd huge returns fur investors/buyers in the housing market. There \\·as 
money to be made in housing even if a buyer had to take out a subprimc ARM at a relatively 
high interest rate. This sort of speculation became so prevalent that homebuilders began to write 
into buyers' contracts provisions against reselling new homes within a year's time to fend o!T the 
investor/buyers. "Speculative activity may hove hnd a greater role in generating the recent price 
increases than it has customarily had in the past," according to Alan Greenspan in 2005. [78] [27] 
But speculation on the MBSs themselves rather than just the housing market was a 
growing issue. One investor website advised, "Interest rates have evolved to sprout 'commodity' 
f~aturcs with the advent of the $6.1 trillion dol!ar value Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) 
market. The MBS has created liquidity and relative volatility for a typically illiquid security, 
making it prime for speculation.'' [79] r 1] 
Further. a nl.'w type of highly complex financial risk-swapping was taking Wall Street by 
stom1 just before the crisis. Called credit default S\vaps or CDSs. these nev.· types of investment 
insurance cuntracts allowed investors to purchase an asset. such as an MBS, and hire a third 
party to insure them against Joss on the investment. For a detailed discussion on CDSs, sec 
Appendix II. In return. the third party would receive a si.lcable fee. This type of insurance has 
potential to lead to a serious ethical issue called moral Jw:ard. Moral hazard was a particularly 
significant issue in the MBS markets due to their highly speculative nature. 127] [Sec appendix 
for a thorough discussion of the natun: of CDSs] 
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Moral hazard involves a situation where an investor, hanker, lender. or purchaser who 
possesses insuram:e uses the decreased risk exposure that insurance provides to leverage 
investments with higher risk than nom1ally would be acceptable. Moral ha?.a.rd describes in 
economic tem1s the proliferation of risk in a market without a suflicient reason for the increase. 
However, moral ha;.ard can lead to short-tenn prosperity through increased investment. The 
CDSs seemed to the financial community like the innovation of a lifetime since they pumped the 
MBS markets up through increasing moral hazard. The swaps would aiiO\\' institutions such as 
hanks to tum riskier investments into assets and collateral of the highest quality by severely 
underestimating the risk and hiring someone else to take even that risk. [39] 
Complex computer models deemed investments such as MBSs to have almost perfect 
credit ratings in the aggregate. After all, only a few defaults were to be expected due to booming 
real estate markets. These defaults would easily be smoothed over by the diversified nature of the 
securities. The selling of these CDSs was highly profitable. since the swap was what transfomted 
an everyday mortgage into a financial product tantamount to AAA rated bonds. This philosophy 
was adopted wholesale by AIG Financial Products. the new financial insurance subsidiary that 
insurance giant AIG created to sell the m:w CDSs. [32) 
As the real estate bubble inflated. profits from this subsidiary skyrocketed, and AIG's 
exposure to the mortgage bat:kcd securities market increased dramatically. However. AIG had 
collateral for its insurance. Computer models told it that large-scale defaults on the MBSs would 
be impossible actuarially. Moreover, there were credit ratings from trusted rating agencies to 
verify these assumptions. [2] [32] 
How accurate were the credit ratings? Congress held a hearing in October, 2008. where 
testimony read as follows: 
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The leadmg credit rating agencies- Standard and Poor's. Moody's, and F1tch - .are 
essential fmanc1al gatekeepers. They rate debt obligations based on the ability of the issuer to 
make timely payments. A triple-A rating has been regarded as the gold standard for safety and 
security of these mvestments for nearly a century. 
As our fmancial marl<ets have grown more complex. the role of the credit ratmg agencies has 
grown m Imparlance. Between 2002 and 2007, Wall Street 1ssued a flood of securities and 
collateralized debt obligations (called COOs) backed by rtsky subprime loans. These new 
fmancial inventions were so complex that virlually no one really understood them. 
Unforlunately for investors. the triple-A ratmgs that proved so lucratiVe for the rating agencies 
soon evaporated. S&P has downgraded more than two-thirds of its investment-grade ratings 
Moody's had to downgrade over 5.000 morlgage-backed securities (15] 
Many questions arose about the seemingly boundless profligacy of the financial wizards. 
Why so many suhprimc loans? Why would anyone believe complex financial contraptions would 
nullify the fundamental financial principle of not loaning to those who ~..:an not pay hack? Why 
would banks usc MBSs to provide such a large percentage of their collatcrali:.r.ation? In 2003. 
one-third of com~1crcial hank and thrift assets were mortgage-related. As long as the r\!al t:statc 
market was climbing, the BC\\' roles that mortgages played in the U.S. cconom) benefitted nearly 
everyone. Ironically, one group that did not reap the benefit from sky-high home prices was the 
home buyers who v. ishcd to purchase with cash or legitimate collateral. Soon the very 
innovations that on~c brought swift ~uccess would bring equally rapid downl~tll. [31] [381 
Suddenly, in early 2006. the first whiff of trouble began when many ARMs adjusted 
upwards and homcbuycrs started missing payments. Newly-built homes began to remain 
unpurchased as the housing market peaked, and foreclosures on existing mortgages rose. 
Because of speculation and extraordinary demand, the real estate market had turned into a 
bubble. or an unsustainably high priced group of assets. As the bubble began to deflate. and 
housing prices declined, homcbuycrs began to be "upside down." or owe more than their equity 
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in their homes. Strangely enough, this meant that these homebuyers could have greater net worth 
as homeless defaulters than as homeowners. But not only were homcov.mcrs hurting. Their 
creditors were beginning to hurt. too. In December of 2006, Ov.mit Mortgage Solutions filed for 
bankruptcy. In February of2007, People's Choice Mortgage was next in bankruptcy court, 
followed by the largest subprime lender. New Century Financial. on April 2. Moody's credit 
rating company began to slash the ratings of remaining subprime securities. [ 20 J [ 21] 
Jt was not just the subprime lenders themscl••es that \\ere going down. Homeowner 
defaults continued to increase, and the toxicity spread. The ride to the top of the bubble had been 
swift and exhilarating. and the ride down would prove equally swift, yet dismal. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of2002 had established strict and conservative accounting standards and hefty 
penalties for non-compliance in an effort to keep hanks' balance sheets accurate. l Jowevcr, in the 
real estate bubble markets, this efTort may have actually led to a dramatic underpricing ofbanks' 
assets and a subsequent wave of financial institution insolvency. (33] 
Mark-to-market accounting. or fair value accounting, dictates that financial institutions 
must adjust the dollar amounts for ussets on their hooks to current market value, rather than their 
original purchase price. This works insofar as the market valuation is reasonable. However. when 
markets dramatically overprice or underprice a large r<mge of assets, banks' balance sheets will 
reflect this reality with an unrealistically optimistic or dismal financial status. According to 
economist Brian Wcsbury, .. [While 1 it is true that the root of this crisis is bad mortgage loans ... 
probably 70% of the real crisis that we face today is caused by mark-to-market accounting in an 
illiquid market.'' This percentage estimate may be excessive, hut mark-to-market regulations 
undeniably played a major role in the crisis. Whether mark-to-market accounting rules wen.· the 
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caw,.: or simply the messenger is also up for debate. For a comprehensive analysis of this issue. 
sec Appendix I of this paper entitled ··Mart.. -to-Market Accounting.·· [ 6) 
In the case of the current financial crisis, the real estate market took a dramatic swing 
downward. Mortgage-exposed assets on balance sheets bcl:ame dramatically underpriced. Credit 
rating agencies lowered their assessments ofthcsc assets. Financial institutions \Wrc forced to 
slash valuations of their collateralization and assets. This became a cycle, sending banks on a 
swift trip toward insolvency. Financial institutions found their own credit ratings lowered. Their 
investors got nervous, the buyers of the mortgage-exposed assets bid lower, and more cre,ditors 
made collateral options calls. They demanded that hanks show mor~? liquidity than they \\l!rc able 
as the cycle continued. [33) [50] 
If banks could have used a fairer assessment of their mortgage-related assets than market 
value. the situation may not have been as serious. However. Sarbanes-Oxley prevented a more 
favorable approach. As banks saw balance sheets deteriorate, stock prices v.:ent into free fall. The 
spiral toward insolvency became a vicious, self-perpetuating cycle. This cycle ran its course 
through bani.. after bank. The circumstance~ "'rought havoc on first the real estate and later the 
Jinancial markets in the U.S., leading to an unenviable economic situation. 
Of the financial mega-institutions. Jirst to go was investment giant Bear-Steams. It had to 
declare bankruptcy in two of its hedge funds in August. 2007. Big banks \\\~rl! also losing money. 
Citigroup stated $40 billion losses over six months in October. Investment bank Merrill Lynch 
disclosed a $7.9 billion bad debt exposure. Morgan Stanley posted $3.7 billion losses. 129] 
Then the banks began to fall one by one. It began with the purchase of Bear-Stearns by 
J.P. Morgan Chase. arranged by the U.S. government in March. 2008. Next. the Independent 
National Mortgage Corporation (commonly knO\'I.'n as lndyMac) was seized in July. becoming 
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the largest thrill institution to fail in U.S. history. In early September, the U.S. government seized 
control of Farmie Mac and Freddie Mac, the two publicly-traded agencies that together hdd or 
guaranteed over half of U.S. mortgages. This shifted the burden of responsibility for mound $5 
trillion of mortgages onto U.S. taxpayers. Later that month. Lehman Brothers announced that it 
was looking actively for a buyer, hut was unable to find one. After being refused a government 
bailout. Lehman Brothers decl:m:d bankruptcy. This was the largest U.S. bankruptcy filing in 
history. Soon. BanJ.. of America worked out a deal to purchase Merrill Lynch. Within two days, 
the government promised funds in the fom1 of nn $85 billion emergency loan to save insurance 
giant AIG from a fate similar to Lehman Bros. [21] [22] [55] [Sec the timdinc on p. 32 for a 
sequence of these events] 
The government established its status as lender of last resort, albeit a selective one. at this 
point. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve pumped funds into the financial system in an attempt to 
slow the crisis. As public tension increased, the li:dcral government began promising a bailout to 
purchase many of the toxic assets and alleviate economy-wide tension over the crisis. The 
casualties continued. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became bank holding companies 
under the close watch of the Fed. Soon, Washington Mutual topped Indy Mac as the largest thrift 
failure in the U.S. Wells Fargo soon acquired Wachovia, and JP Morgan gathered what was left 
of Washington Mutual. On September 29. the house rejected the first round of proposed bailout 
legislation. That sam~ day. the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 777.68 points, the largest one-
day loss of all time. As the markets continued to faiL pressure on Congress increased rapidly. An 
altered version of the original bailout proposal was soon passed and signed into law by President 
Bush on October 3, 2008. This finaliLcd version would be known as TARP. [21] [22] 
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Part Ill: The Birth of TARP 
The TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) plan was only part oLm extensive piece of 
legislation, including soml.! 117 pag\!s. known as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008. The most important section ofthc legislation is Title I, \vhich established TARP. While 
TARJ> has been commonly referred to as the "bailout," it is not the only means through which 
banking stimulus activity occurred in the 20m~ crisis. 
Only afler many of the major bankruptcies had been announced in September wus the 
legislation passed. \\:hilc TARP was slow to take form, increased spending occurred overnight. 
Even before the TARP funds were approved. the bailout had already begun. In March, 2008. the 
Fed hud already provided u $29 billion loun to JP Morgan Chase as part of the Bear-Steurns 
acquisition dcul and promised up to $200 billion for loans to help improye the desirability of 
MBSs in the markets. In September. the Treasury had put hmnie Mac and Freddie Mac under 
government oversight and used $200 billion to guarantee their assets. ll1c Fed had guaranteed 
$85 billion to salvage AI G. and made hundreds of billions more available to stimulate banking 
liquidity. Therefore. the TARP funds were by no mcuns the first round ofbailing out the banks. 
In reality, TARP would become the long-tcnn manifestation of the ongoing attempt to fix the 
nation's financial toxicity, since must of the major financial industry bankruptcies happened in 
September. 2008. before TARP was even passed. In the short-tcm1. (i) mergers. acquisitions, and 
liquidations within the banking industry and (ii) lending from the Fed were the methods of 
dealing \\ ith the immediate consequences of the tinancial crisis. [ 41] ! olS J 
This long-tcnn view ofTARP·s purpose is consistent with the bailout's original language. 
According to the legislation, the T/\RP bailout act \\as passed "For the purposes of providing 
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stahility to and preventing disruption in the economy and financial system ... " This general 
purpose was to he accomplished through "Immediately provid(ing] authority and facilities that 
the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of 
the United States." TARP from the beginning was cstahlished as a long-term project whose 
intentions were to bring long-teml stability and liquidity stimulus. 184 j 
Consistent with the acronym, the purchase of trouhled assets was TARP's original 
purpose. According to the legislation. the Secretary of the Treasury was given hroad powers in 
the administration of the trouhled assets purchasing process: 
The Secretary IS authonzed to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (or "TARP') to 
purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any fmancial 
institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Secretary. and in accordance 
with this Act and the policies and procedures developed and published by the Secretary. {84] 
Through purchasing these assets. TARP originally had two goals. according to the 
legislation itself: 
The purposes of thts Act are--
(1) to immediately prov1de authonty and fac1fttJes that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to 
restore liquidity and stabiltty to the fmancial system of the United States. and 
(2) to ensure that such authority and such facilities are used in a manner that--
(A) protects home values. college funds. retirement accounts. and ltfe savings. 
(B) preserves homeownership and promotes JObs and economic growth: 
(C) maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers of the United States: and 
(D) provides public accountability for the exerc1se of such authority. (84] 
To ful!ill part (2), TARP included the estahlishment of the Financial Stahility Oversight Board. 
which would monitor the hailout's progress, and the cstahlishment of the OITice of Financial 
Stability. that \vould assist the Secretary ofthc Treasury in the administration ofTARP. [841 
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Part (1) of the purpose statement describes the central purpose ofTARP: restore stability 
and increase liquidity. These ar~ clearly long-tem1 goals, ami they arc somewhat vague. It is 
ditlicult to evaluate TARP through measuring ~ithcr liquidity or stability. Measurement of 
liquidity is a precise science, requiring detailed experimental controls and llata appraisals. Any 
increases in liquidity cannot be linkcll causally to a single intervention or to any intervention at 
all. since liquidity fluctuates from natural economic causes. Funher. reliable experiments v.:ith 
control groups are impossible in a real world economic situation. Measurement of stability is a 
subjective endeavor, although lack of volatility may hint at the presence of stability. 
Complicating the situation is the evolution ofTARJ>. It is hard to pin llown one philosophy, 
appropriation. or institution as a summary ofTARP's charge. [47) 
The original bailout bill included a provision of a grand limit of$700 billion of 
expenditures. with two phases of$350 billion each. The tirst phase made up to $250 billion 
available immediately and up to $350 billion available with the President's cenification 
submittcll in \.>..rriting to Congress. The second phase made the tina! $350 billion available. [13] 
After Congress approved these funds. they were not spent immediately. In fact. money 
from the first phase was still being distributed in January of 2009. When: exactly did all this 
money go? Tracing these expenditures is crucial to tracking the bailout. Many provisions of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act arc rather vague. Many originally planned expenditures 
w~re altered anll revised as the economic situation revealed itself. The Secretary of the Treasury 
originally was given authority under IARP to purchase strictly "troubled assets" with the billions 
of dollars allocated. In actual practice. early TARP funds \\Cilt to inject capital in banks starting 
in early October. ::W08. 144) [57] 
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As soon as October l41h. the treasury announced that it would spend $250 billion of the 
TARP funds to ''inject capital into banks.'' This marked a fundamental philosophical shift in the 
use of bailout funds. Suddenly. the bailout's long·tcnn goal was no longer to rcmO\'C toxic assets 
by purchasing them directly. Instead. the plan became to pun:hasc preferred stock, or stock that 
pays a dividend. from troubled hanks. This change in direction added to the public confusion of 
the bailout's process for improving the economy, hut was by no m~:.·an~ the final word on where 
the bailout's evolving role would carry it. Eventually, a shift hack to the original purpose of 
purchasing troubled assets did occur later in the bailout's life. [41] 148] [76] 
As TARP continued to evolve. it wound up investing in two categories of hanks. First. 
large hanks who \Vcre targeted for TARP in\'cstmcnt were subjected to a "stress test.'' The test 
wns based on a scrutiny of balance sheet account!S with a variety of pro tonna situations 
projected for the following two years of operations. Banks that were projected to become 
insol\'ent with two years of operation in an en\'ironment of economic downturn \Vcrc approved 
for lending. The second category ofTARP investment was small banks. These hanks were only 
allov.-cd to participate in TARP if they '"'ere already strong. The purpose of this program was to 
increase lending in the financial sector as a whole. [58] 
The first $293.7 hillion chunk ofTARP expenditures was eventually divided into four 
categories. The final total spending in each of these programs was calculated in a January 2009 
Government Accountability Otlicc report. Under the main category. the Capital Purchase Plan. 
the Treasury Secretary purchased $194.2 billion of preferred stock shares in some 317 tinancial 
institutions. This was arguably the most substantial action taken by TARP. inasmuch a~ it 
allowed the U.S. Treasury to hold massive equity stakes in fom1erly publicly-traded banking 
firms. The Treasury explained that it wished to "consider all options" for the bailout funds. and it 
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felt that the capital injection plan should focus on Jirect investment in banks "'because of the 
economic leverage that could be gained" from increased bank lending. I Iowever. many criticizeJ 
the program's new shift as ""undermining privatization." As David John of the Heritage 
Foundation put it, ""Policymakers must ensure that the result is not a legacy of political control of 
the linancial system, threatening the efficiency of markets and the principle of private 
ownership." No matter one's view of it. however. the Capital Purchase Plan's direct investment 
into banks remains an integral part of the 'IARP plan. [42] [41] [48] [66[ [64] 
It is important to make a distinction at this point. The TARP execution strategy vacillated 
between two main philosophies: the asset approach and the institutional approach. The assct 
approach focuses on purchasing and holding troubled assets, thereby removing them from the 
market. The purchase helps market participants by taking the assets. off their books. The holding 
of the assets helps restore contidence in the markets since trading volume is reduced anJ market 
participants arc more willing to purchase securities if the government holds a large number of 
similar securities. The institutional approach focuses on institutions by taking equity stakes in 
them. The distinction between these two approaches is useful in the analysis ofTARP. 
Two other 'IARP programs an:! worth noting. Calkd the Systematically Significant 
Failing Institutions (SSFI) program and the Targeted Investment Program (TIP). these initiatives 
received $40 billion apiece. TIP Jealt largely \\'ith the saving of the Citigroup company. among 
other direct investments in forms of capital. As such, TIP was the only part of the bailout that 
really followcJ the original plan. SSFI allmvcd de post facto for the money that haJ already been 
spent to keep AIG atloat. [41] [48j [53] 
Even more treasury programs were unJcr the bailout umbrella. such as the Asset 
Guarantee Program, which provided insurance for troublcJ assets in an attempt consistent with 
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the asset approach originally delineated for TARP. Further. another category w<.~s the Automoti\'~ 
Industry Financing Program. which provided funds to the automobile manufacturing industry. 
This expenditure may seem tota1ly unrelated. hut the automobile industry crisis could he seen as 
a sister bubble to the housing bubble. Purchasing cars on credit became more difiicult when the 
MBS markets crashed and credit tightened throughout the economy. This led to a large decrease 
in demand for automobiles that mirrored the crash in demand for new mortgages. While rdated 
to the overall situation. however, an automobile manufacturer stimulus is a dear deviation from 
TARP's original purpose of restoring liquidity to hanks and financial institutions. [ 41] [52] l65] 
These catcgoriz.ations have shown how creative thl' Treasury can become in spending 
money allocated to bailouts. The bailout's theoretical course of action began in the asset-based 
direction, hut took a major shift toward equity investment rather than securities investment when 
it came time to actually write checks. Advocates ofthe equity purchase philosophy at the Fed 
began considering a more securities-focused plan with quantitative casing in 2009 after having 
time to analyze the situation thoroughly. The bailout. despite the hundreds of pages of legislation 
and explanation. remained a work in progress throughout its lifetime. Aggravating this \'l.'as the 
end of Paulson's term as Secretary of the Treasury and the start of Timothy Gcithner as his 
replacement. With the American Rcin\'cstmcnt and Recovery Act of2009. Congress essentially 
decided to scrap the TARP framc\vork so it could focus on broader economic intervention 
rneasur~s.IX8) {12] 
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Part IV: Analysis of TARP 
I low cfiectivc was the bailout? It is ditlicuh to tell without genie-like speculation how 
much direct ctTcct the TARP investment has had on liquidity of troubled assets as well as on the 
o\'crall ''stability .. of the economy. Banks still kept many of those troubled assets in the same 
places on their balance sheets. Little ctTcct on liquidity of MBSs was immediately noticeable 
since most ofTARP funds were invested in systemic injections of cash through purchase of 
stocks or other fom1s of capitalization. One way to analyze the TARP program's cficctiveness is 
to compare it with a similar event in history: the United States' S&L Crisis recovery. 
The S&L Crisis. \\'hose recovery was guided by the government-run Resolution Trust 
Corporation (RTC). could be regarded as the nc.:arcst thing to success in the way of government-
hacked economic disaster recovery. This particular recovery ended up costing taxpayers as little 
as $145 billion by some estimates, much lower than original expectations of$500 billion. The 
RTC also completed its charge and self-destructed ahead of schedule. Docs this mean that the 
RTC was a success? Should one be similarly optimistic ahout the TARP progran1? The answers 
to both these questions depend on interpretation. The RTC had many elements of succcs~. TARP 
does have some similarities \Vith the RTC. The outcome of T:'\RP is nevertheless::!. unique event. 
Comparisons do give one general suggestions tO\·Vard detcm1ining hov.· successful TARP's 
outcome has been. ( l.t] ( I 7] [ 91 ] 
The RTC began, much as the TARP bailout. in a hasty succession of events spurred on hy 
a deepening tinancinl crisis. Similarly, in hoth bailouts the focus hcgan with removing the 
trouhlcd assets from ti1L' markets. The RTC bailout moved more consistently in this direction thnn 
I ARP from the beginning. The RTC"s sole purpose was to sell already nhtaincd assets from 
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insolvent S&L's. Eventually. $459 billion in nsscts were sold from S&L's valued nt around $394 
billion. Some money was recouped for the Treasury. The operation still ended up costing money. 
Overall, however, the RTC did afrcct the solution of a major problem. but its ctlicicncy remains 
debatable. 114] [17] 
How much of the S&L Crisis was actually sold back into the markets? How much was 
eventually paid for in a disguised manner through the banking fabric of the Fcdcml Reserve. the 
Treasury, and other agencies through years of slow osmosis of illiquid assets? The S&L Crisis 
was a highly expensive episode beyond which the U.S. economy has completely moved. The 
RTC could be seen as a conduit to this movement. but not a force necessary to the markets' 
healing. The RTC (like TARP) did not even exist until well into the crisis. Its function could haw 
been performed by other agencies. Institutions it liquidated had been bankrupt or in poor 
condition for so long that the markets arguably could have moved on eventually without the RTC 
to solve the problem for them. The amount the RTC changed the outcome is. as with T ARP. 
uncertain. One simply cannot separate all the variables at play. 114] fl7] 
Further, 1 A RP and RTC have one major di flc renee: the RTC "as not designed to 
nationnlizc or create a government ownership share in bnnks like the lARP has done. This 
nationalization has taken place quietly and the original plan did not include it. Nevertheless, the 
RTC sought to stabiliLc the markets of its day solely through the purchase and sale of assets. It 
never moved into public purchasing and holding stock in troubled institutions. 
Those who administered the RTC have many words of wisdom for today's bailout artists. 
Real ~?State analyst Joseph Robert explained that the analysis of an RTC-era fonncr S&L security 
would have taken around 90 days. hut a similar analysis of a credit default swap insured MBS is 
far more complex because of the large and far-removed pool of assets hacking each security. 
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How could these assets be fairly evaluated and purchased? Apparently in TARP's case. the easy 
way out in early October, 2008, was to purchase stock and equity in banks themselves rather than 
face the root cause of the crisis, the actual assets. [801 [ 70 J 
This RTC principle demonstrates a fundamental problem in the 2008 crisis: lack of 
confidence. No on~;: had enough confidence to purchase the MBSs. CDOs. and by extension, 
bank stock and funds. etc. No one, not cwn the Treasury administering the bailout funds. was 
c<mfidcnt enough to step into the markets and stan a chain of purchases. Everyone feared either 
selling the assets too low or buying them too high. Since the assets' former values were clearly 
deh:m1ined by a bubble. now a realistic valuation method was necessary. A purchaser and seller 
of assets must verify that method through actually purchasing and unfreezing the securities 
markets. A chicken and egg dilemma stalled the market. l Jntil restoration of contidence occurred, 
the markets presumably would remain frozen and the bailout's goal would not be achieved. [87] 
All bailouts have to deal with deep-seated issues of corruption and greed. In order to usc 
established financial channels and avoid nationali7.ation of financial market administration, the 
managers of the RTC used private companies to perform much of the investment liquidation 
work. Because of this, they cncounh:red problems not only with those who wished to profit 
inordinately at taxpayer expense by the purchase of liquidated assets but also with private 
companies abusing bail.out privileges, funds, and contrads. According to one business law 
institutional research report. the RTC used private sector services in the following areas: 
• Auction services 
• Asset ValuatiCln services 
• Asset management services (scrvicers of securitized pools) 
• New debt origination (as pan of the securitization process) 
• Capital market offerings (once securitized. these assets needed to be brought to the 
capital markets) 1811 
The TARP legislation largely avoided private administration of bailout programs. relying 
on the Fed and the U.S. Treasury instead. Nevertheless. the lesson remains: those who receive 
assistance. dole out assistance. and approve applications for assistance must be carefully 
monitored through internal control. How much of this across-the-board accountability was built 
into TARP? Congress and the administrators ofTARP uddcd additionul provisions that 
contributed to TARP's difficulty drifting among various goals and disconnected stimulus activity 
with no common thread. [70] 
From the beginning. the bailout legislation was full of what most would deem earmark 
expenditures. Many of these took the fom1 of tax cuts. Children's wooden practice arrows were 
exempted from excise tux. Motorsports complexes were given more favorable tax treatment. 
Bicycle commuters \\ere given tax breaks. Tax credits were given to certain developers of 
American Surnoa. These endeavors arc clearly unrelated to uny form of bailout activity. Many 
would sec these as obvious pork designed to lur~ votes for the stimulus package. At any rate. 
from the beginning the bailout W<L'i beset wjth handout seekers. [41] [481 
One of the biggest challenges of a builout. especially when bailing out banks and not 
assets. is deciding which companies will live and which will die. Lchmun Brothers. for example. 
was deemed unnecessary to basic U.S. economic stability and was allowed to go into bankruptcy. 
AI G. on the other hand. was deemed essential to staving ofT complete collapse due to its huge 
market share of reinsurance. AIO was saved at huge expense. These fire sale decisions of the 
September, 2008. period of the financial crisis were only the beginning. Many of the failing 
banks w~rc hastily merged with other banks. such us Bank of America's govcmmcnt~contrived 
purchase of Merrill Lynch. This merger seemed like a solution better than bankruptcy for Merrill 
Lynch at the time. Arguably. however. the merger has bogged down Bank of America so much 
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that the result was just a delayed bankruptcy or restructuring much larger than the original. 
Worse than just delaying a bankruptcy is creating a so-called "zombie bank·· that remains in 
operation by the Jifdinc of bailout funds but fails to add any lending to the economy. Such a 
phenomenon is attributed to the lengthy period of recovery in the Japanese economy following a 
banking crisis.l28]169] 
TARP administrators were forced to deal \\~th requests from not just banks but from 
entirely diiTcrcnt industries. Since the bailout was opened up to automakcrs, it seems the 
floodgates were unlatched, and the world trampled up the Treasury steps seeking bailouts for 
every imaginable n:ason. The steel industry wanted a bailout. Retailers demanded sales tax 
holidays. The U.S. infrastructure should be fixed with bailout funds. lt even goes as far as Larry 
Flint and Joe francis, infamous pornographers, traveling to Washing1on to ask for a bailout for 
the adult entertainment industry. Unnecessary bailouts were especially encouraged to proliferate 
when TARP funds were appropriated all at once and were officially allocated to diOcrcnt 
endeavors at later dates.!83] [47] [67] 
The Rl C' undeniably had a better-defined, less complex 1-)0ursc of action to follow than 
TARP. The Government Accountability Oflice (GAO) stated in January. 2009. after a detailed 
review of Ti\RP, "The Treasury has made limited progress in formatting. articulating and 
communicating an overall strategy for Ti\RP." While the Treasury has publicized broad 
overviews of its individual asset and ownership TARP purchase plans, this still docs not 
communicate the overall purpose and unifying strategy of the program. According to the GAO, 
"The lm:k of a clearly articulated vision has complicated Treasury's ability to effectively 
communicate to Congress. the financial markets, and the public on the bcnetits ofTARP ... " 
Perhaps this brings up the fundamental dillercncc bel\\ccn 'IARP and the RTC: the RTC's goal of 
cleaning up the S&L Crisis through liquidations and merg~rs was much clearer than TARP's 
more nebulous purpose of stabilizing and increasing liquidity. [41 J [ 48] 
This comparison has served as a guide to the unfolding character and ctfccts of the TARP 
bailout. Many other indicators could be mentioned. such as the government's claim that the top 
20 banks receiving government rescue funds reduced lending slightly in the last three months of 
2008. Was this a symptom ofthe failure ofTARP to increase liquidity. or simply nn unavoidable 
consequence of being in a recession? Indicators such as this reveal the dilliculty of using 
economic statistics alone to assess TARP's cffectiveness.[41] [48] [61] 
Economics is a complex science. There is not a perfect solution to financial crises. 
However. those who do not study the past arc doomed to repeat it. Plainly, studying the financial 
crisis. TARP. and future stimulus activity is wcH worth the economic understanding gained. As 
the beginning of this paper discussed. it is important to analyze economic events in a sequential 
fashion since economics tracks the continuance of ongoing events. In order to fa~o:ilitate this type 
of understanding. a table on the following page chronologically summarizes major government 
bailout activities since the stock market crash of 1929. 
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Timeline 
-1929 1930- 1932 1934 1957 1970 1971 
1931 
-
Great Roosevelt Reconstruction FDIC is RFC is Pt:nn Lockh~~d 
Depression campmgns Finance Corp. established dismantled Central Martin 
begins on established Railroad bailout 
with stock platform bailout 
market of public 
crash works 
stimulus 
1974 1975 1977 1979 1980 1981- 1984 1989 
1982 
Franklin New Community Volcker Chrysler Savings Continental RTC 
National York Reinvestment tightens bailout and lllinois established 
Bank City Act passed money Loan baiiClut by 
bailout bailout supply, industry FIRREA 
leading loses 
to high around 
interest $9 
rates billion 
2001 2002 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 
Airline Sarbanes- 886 12.5% NINJA Greenspan Credit- 10 year 
bailout Oxley S&Ls mcrcase loans, warns of default MBS 
passed: have 111 ARMs, and danger in swaps grov..1h 
Mark-tCl- assets housing sccuriti7.ation speculative popularized exceeds 
Market of pnc~s are maJor investment all bond 
Accounting $1.35 market activity types 
trillion phenomena 
12006 
- I 2006 Dec. 2007 Aug. March July "00t1 2007 200& 2008 
- ---1000% ARMs First Mortgage Bear JP Indy Mac 
grov.1h in begin maJor lenders Steams Morgan seized 
securitized to mClrtgage continue 111 Chase 
mClrtgagcs adjust J.:nder to go trouble buys 




-Fannie Mac and Freddie Mac bankrupt -Lehman Brothers bankrupt 
-Bank of America acquires Merrill Lynch -Dow falls 777.68. a record fall 
-AIG put Cln life support -Federal Reserve increases money supply 
-Goldman Sachs. Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual, Wachovia all go bankrupt or arc 
acquired 
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October 2008 
TARP and Emergency Economic Stimulus Act passed 
Part V: The Short-Term 
In order to even deal in the n:alm of mark-to-market accounting, a company must make a 
conscious choice to speculate. AIG. Lehman Bros .• and friends were not in the MBS and CDO 
markets for the long-term. They had the ability to usc the held-to-maturity (HTM) accounting 
category \vhich pennitted a long-tenn strategy focused on interest payments. Banks and financial 
institutions traditionally usc such a strategy. In the IITM category. assets on the balance sheet an: 
carried at cost with revenue recognized from periodic: interest payments. However. AIG and 
similar institutions wanted to be able to reap huge profits in the short-tenn. Therefore. they chosl.:" 
the mark-to-market categories over the safety and stability of the HTM category. [See Appendix 
I on mark-to-market accounting for a more thorough treatment of the accounting treatment of 
securities] 
Short-tenn focus is not exclusive to AIG and Lehman. The stock market itself has an 
illogic.:al obsession with the short-term. Stocks are monitored on a daily, even hourly, basis. This 
short-term analysis exists despite the fact that companies behind them only can c.:rcate financial 
statement net income annually. and only pay dividends quarterly. As any entrepreneur v. ill say. 
one who invests in a business must be ready for a long-tenn ride. It would be foolish to start a 
business and expect income an hour later. Yet, the stock market is regularly milked for prolits in 
the extreme shon-tenn. 
AIG and Lehman wanted mark-to-market accounting for their assets before the crisis. 
They wanted it so they c.ould make huge profits from shon-tcml speculation, as the asseb they 
created rode the market bubble up. Only when the curve switches and goes down do these 
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companies complain. The market huhhlc fooled everyone: few could sec it coming. At least, 
most chose to ignore because of the thrill of ever-increasing markets. The market bubble is the 
result of this chosen ignorance. Investors, who choose to ignore fundamental values at their own 
peril, drive market bubbles through speculation. The 2008 crisis bubble was the result of many 
market participants buying into the short-tem1 focus and the false promises of always-up growth. 
Debt securities were never designed for the short-term. Who takes out a mortgage for a 
day? What companies would issue a bond for a week? Since debt securities involve steady 
obligations of interest. it is ditlicult to justify wild swings in their prices. Cash flows of interest 
arc predictable and regular. The only thing that stops these cash flows is bankruptcy. The 
possibility of bankruptcy can be hedged against with statistical calculations. The only way to 
change the nature of the debt security. and ultimately the market that trades it. is by speculating 
and creating a short-tcm1 game out of something inherently long-tem1. 
Is mark-to-market accounting to blame? True. marking assets to market value is 
sometimes brutal: Lehman and AIG may have been able to survive if they had been able to avoid 
marking assets to market. But it was these companies that chose to speculate. Mark-to-market 
simply accounted tor their choice. They reaped the upward rewards: what basis do they have to 
complain when the opposite situation occurs? As explained in the appendix addressing the mark-
to-market rules. the rules arc not the culprit: speculation where speculation never should he is at 
fault. These rules arc simply the n1esscnger. Do not shoot the messenger. 
The stock market is in New York, not Las Vegas. Banks arc not casinos. Debt securities 
an.· not slot machines. Mark-to-market rules ar~ like the police in that these mles used their 
authority and force to bring a just punishment to those whose short-tem1 focus tumed the 
_.UI P a g c 
important societal institution of the finan~:ial markets into a means to gamble. Ultimately. mark-
to-market has acted to protect th~ public. 
Of course. when the bad decisions were exposed. the markets had to adjust. When 
excessive speculation was revealed to be driving the markets. innated assets had to he n..·valucd. 
This revaluation process is necessarily painful. The financial crisis was the obvious and 
unavoidable result. 
The culprits of the crisis arc revealed: those with short-tem1 focus. They made the choice 
of speculation and mark-to-market. and these entititics must deal with the consequences oftheir 
choices. The issue is that the short-tem1 focused speculators also happened to be key financial 
institutions to the U.S. financial system and economy as a whole. The goal ofT/\RP was to 
minimize the impact of the poor choices of a few to the public financial sector. 
One should not measure T/\RP's success by the numhcr of financial institutions it savc:s 
or salvages. Ultimately. the mca~ure should be how cheaply and efficiently TARP restores 
confidence in the financial markets and adds to economic growth. TARP had the choice of the 
asset or institutional approach to achieve this goal. 
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Part VI: Conclusions on TARP 
This paper distinguishes between the asset and the institutional approach to the bailout. 
The government ultimately selected a combination of both tactics. The failure to select and 
follow one of these two approaches may have been a product of the somcv.·hat haphazard and 
urgent design of the bailout legislation. Despite the lack of a consistent approach. the bailout. 
especially TARP. enjoyed surprising success. 
The funds distributed under ·1 ARP nc,·cr passed $411 billion. despite the $700 billion 
ceiling. The amount outstanding under TARP has been reduced to $1 04 billion. The investment 
has fared well, with the rl'St on track to be repaid. The Congressional Budget Ofiice's estimate of 
the final cost ofTARP is $19 billion. This number is relatively small compared to the potential 
continuation and worsening of the iinancial crisis. The institutional approach taken to invest in 
at-risk companies has not resulted in excessive TARP loan defaults and losses. This indicates a 
successful saving of the companies playing a key role in the markets. [ 89] 
The Congressional Budget Oflicc holds that the bailout added I .5 to 3.5 percent to 
economic growth in 2009. This is a diflicult estimate to make. but any contribution to economic 
growth was very much needed in the rccessionary situation following th~: 2008 crisis. [89 J 
With the institutional approach, it is imperative to a\·oid moral ha:t . .ard brought about by 
bailing out the very companies who had the irrational short-tcnn focus and fraudulent 
philosophies. This means that the government's seemingly harsh decision to allow Lehman 
Brothers to f~til was a good one after all. In acting to help AIG deemed ''too big to fail.'' the 
government took a larger risk. Moral hazard is an unfortunate byproduct of this intervention. 
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Nevertheless, the equity related actions ofTARP appeared to have a useful cfTect on the LIBOR-
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This chart was prepared by John Taylor of Stanford University for usc in a Congressional 
hearing in March, 2011. 1t shows the apparent intlucnce of the TARP institutional approach 
announcement in calming the markets. Although correlation does not equal causation. shift from 
a steep increase to a steady decrease points to the efTcctiveness ofthe IARP intervention. [76] 
Turning to the asset approach. the bailout took a turn around 2009 toward acquiring 
Ml3Ss. largely with Fannie Mac:.' and Freddie Mac securities. \\'ith what was called "quantitative 
easing,'' the Federal Reserve otTered trillions in guarantees and purchases of troubled securities. 
This unprecedented intervention essentially \Vas a government guarantee on the entire market. 
Despite its extraordinary nature, it has not so f~u resulted in massive expenses for the Federal 
·BIPagt' 
Reserve. Instead. the guarantees and purchases have brought in income. Billions of dollars of this 
income have been turned over to the Treasury. [41] 1891 
The government involvement in the markets engendered by Fannie Mac and Freddie Mac 
dating back to the Great Depression and developed through legislation ranging from the CRA to 
the I lousing and Urban Development Act (I IUD) came under closer scrutiny in the 2008 crisis. 
lARP took the institutional approach to keeping Fannie and Freddie afloat-in fact. Congress in 
2008 had little choice since these agencies arc responsibilities of the federal government. Since 
the U.S. government already had preexisting obligations regarding solvency maintenance to 
these GSEs. the bailout funds flowing to Fannie and freddie arc really sunk costs when one 
considers the overall success of TARP. In other words, from the point of view of Congress in 
:W08. there was no choice as to whether to hail out the GSEs. This means that in order to 
consider the success ofTARP fairly. the Fannie and Freddie situation should be considered a 
consequence of the previous legislation (dating back to the Great Depression) creating the GSE 
sponsorships. rather than the nc\V 2008 TARP legislation. (71] [73 J 
The bailout funds flowing to Fannie and Freddie do not have a foreseeable stopping 
point. These USEs arc projected to cost around $238 billion to restore solvency. This estimate 
actually climbed by around $40 billion between 2008 and 2010. Fannie Mae continued losing 
money, v.ith a posted loss of $4.6 billion in Q4 2011. Fannie continues asking for additional 
bailout funds as losses post. [71] 
The ongoing insolvent situation with th~ C1SEs has prompted the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency and the Obama administration to create a tentative plan for abolishing the GSEs. 
However. such an action will prove exceedingly diflicult due to the systemic role of the GSEs. 
Fannie and Freddie own or insure ahout half of all mortgages in the U.S. Fannie and Freddie, as 
well as other government agencies, guarantee around 90% of new mortgages issued since the 
2008 crisis. It is noteworthy that the argument that a market player could become "too big to 
fail" has applied most appropriately to government agencies rather than the private financial 
institutions it '"'aS originally used to describe. While the 2008 crisis has revealed the fundamental 
11aws and poor business model behind the GSEs, one must recollect th<.lt the historical roots of 
this problem arc not in the TARP legislation but in legislation from many years ago. [71 J [73] 
174] 
Moving hack to the variable costs and dccision-relc\'ant actions ofTARP, the picture 
becomes brighter. In February 2012, the Federal Reserve noted a profit of $2.8 billion on the sale 
of a $19.5 billion asset portfolio which partially represented the assets purchased from the tire 
sale of AIG and Beam Stearns. Ironically, the purchasers of the asset portfolio. designated 
''Maiden Lane II" after the street behind the Federal Reserve in New York. included Goldman 
Sachs and Credit Suisse, companies which themselves experienced much tumwil during the 
2008 crisis from similar assets. The irony cut even deeper when Sachs and Credit Suisse turned 
around and sold a portion of these assets to the "new" AIG itself. The Federal Reserve still holds 
a $17.6 billion portfolio of assets from the AIG bankruptcy designated as "Maiden Lane III." 
This portfolio represents the credit default swap remnants themselves, perhaps the se.curity most 
culpable in the crisis. Although the Federal Reserve and thus the public is experiencing ongoing 
exposure to the controversial securities behind the crisis, this exposure has proved profitable. In 
early 2012, the Fed announced that it would turn over $77 billion from its IARP related 
investment operations in 2011 alone. [72} 
The bailout's costs have been kept reasonable. e\.·en resulting in some noteworthy 
amounts of income for the public. While the risks taken were enormous from the perspective of 
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2008, hindsight is showing that the risk may not have been as great as the atmosphere of panic at 
the time may have led om· to believe. The- taking on of risk by a government on this unusual 
scale has been surprisingly successful. In conclusion, thl.' bailout of 2008 has enjoyed a 
surprisingly successful three years of operation since this study began. 
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Appendices 
Please Note: The.fir,Hthree appendices are presented in logical order to re:;pond to the question 
raised in the first appendix: Do tht! MIJSs and other securities behind I he crisis possess 
fundamental value? 
Appendix 1: Mark-to-M.arket Accounting 
Accountants arc entrusted with the weighty task of"keeping score" for the world of 
business. They tend to create obscure rules and classifications for linancial matters. Too often. 
these subjective. even arbitrary, accounting decisions detcm1ine who wins and \vho loses in the 
world of business. 
What if a c-ompany cams income of $10,000 and another loses $1 0,000? Which company 
\\ould one wish to invest in? The first. of course! But what if one was made aware that the 
second company uses the cash basis of accounting. while the tirst uses the accrual basis? What if 
unc analyzed both companies and sav,: that both had the same sales transactions during the year? 
Unfortunately. such a scenario is entirely possible. Accounting rules--or even which set of 
accounting rules is chosen~an .. make'' a company profitable or not. 
Even for somronc who is totally objective, dctennining the profitability. revenues. and 
costs of a company is not the same as calculating quantifiable numbers in disciplines such as 
math or physics. There arc those who nevertheless give the dctrnnination of these numbers a 
shot: they arc called. fairly enough. accountants. These people try to make something entirely 
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subjective. such as ··profitability," an objectively measured phenomenon according to a strictly 
defined rule. Accounting is a surprisingly subjective discipline! 
How docs this affect the financial crisis? This paper has already discussed the difliculty in 
nlluation of such assets as MBSs. COOs, and reinsurance. Accounting rules value these assets. 
These values are controversial, especially with the so called ··mark-to-market" rules. 
But ,.,·hen exactly docs fair value accounting (mark-to-market) apply to an MBS'! It may 
he surprising to learn the answer: not always. Actually. it is not even most often. In fact. under 
200R principles of accounting generally accepted in the United States of America, one must all 
hut hend over backwards to enroll balance sheet assets in fair value accounting. Following is a 
closer examination of the rules of accounting regarding dcht instruments hdd hy hank in g. 
lending, and finance institutions. 
The tirst classification for dcht instruments is "held to maturity." This category is true to 
its name in that it is inkndcd to contain securities that will he ov.ncd by the reporting company 
until they reach their maturities. This refers to loans, notes, bonds, or insurance that have a 
certain maturity date (as all dcht must) and a certain amount of interest ov .. ed to the company 
holding the security. The interest payments arc the inccnti,·e to invest in the security. 
This category is incredibly straightforward. Companies huy bonds, or any other security, 
and collect interest payments until maturity. Then, thcy collect the original principle. In order to 
qualify to he an llTM (held to maturity) security. a reporting entity must have hoth the ability 
and intent to hold the security until it matures. This is simple enough; for what other rea!;OllS 
\VOuld a company even v.;ant to hold securities? That issue will be addn:ssc:d soon. 
The good 111 .. ·ws about the IITM category is that assets in it an: held perpetually at cost. 
This means that no matter where there market value goes, they will always he held at the sam~ 
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value: cost. 111M securities never afl'ect net income, other than their interest payments. In fact. 
nothing ever even happens on the balance sheet of the reporting company unless the debtor 
company behind the debt instrument declares bankruptcy! \\'ith this rule. market fluctuations do 
not determine when debt is marked to market. Only actual bankruptcy. not the hint of bankruptcy 
making the market go down, causes losses for holding companies. 
What disadvantage does H I"M have then? With this category. companies need fear no 
balance sheet tum1oil due to their securities. The disadvantage can he summarized in one key 
word: speculation. With HTM. companies arc not able to speculate and enjoy upward 
appreciation in the securities on their balance sheets. 
Fortunately for those interested in speculative investing. another category called ''trading 
securities'' exists. This category docs allmv assets to hi.! marked to market at every financial 
reporting date. All market fluctuations immediately an: directed to the income statement of the 
reporting company. As far as the debtor company goes. actual financial condition (such as 
solvency) is irrelevant to reporting values. Only what the market values the security at is 
relevant. There is no ceiling for gains or tloor for losses in this category. This means high stakes 
speculation can easily occur-the same thrilling speculation that casino gocrs enjoy. And just a!:> 
in the casino. one must meet certain criteria to enter this category. In fact, one must actively work 
to get scc.uritics dassilied as trading securities. Only certain firms are even allowed to usc this 
category due to its highly volatile nature. The accountants creating this category \\.ere no douht 
3\\ar~ of the dangers of marking assets to market tor the financial health of reporting companies. 
which would explain the diflicuhy in being a hie to even use the "trading securities" 
classification. 
The last two a~sd classifications arc "available-for-sale" (AFS) and pension plans. With 
AFS assets. market fluctuations do not appear in net income but in other comprehensive income. 
allO\ving companies to avoid the dangers of marking assets to market in their business operating 
activities. With pension plans. gains and losses due to market fluctuations arc reported within a 
corridor. containing a ceiling tor gains and a floor for losses. This reporting standard is based on 
the statistical idea that the market will fluctuate, but in the long-term markets will move upward. 
Since pension plans have a long-term focus. this method is considered appropriate. These final 
two categories give more credibility to the idea that directing mark-to-market accounling for debt 
instruments directly into the income statement is neither a common practice nor en:n 
recommended by generally accepted accounting principles. Companies who urc affected by 
mark-to-market accounting an: not victims of accounting rules; they an: simply reaping the 
rewards of their choices. 
So if companies actually choose the mark-to-market accounting rules, where does the 
controversy lie? How could Brian Wesbury blame 70% of the crisis on these rules? As previously 
discussed. the problem is that accounting valuations arc often subjective. The controversy 
regarding mark-to-market accounting rules concerns whether the valuations they gave to MBSs 
held in trading securities and available-for-sale categories were objective and fair, or were biased 
by the unusual tluctuation in the markets at the time. [6] 
There arc two different views on the efrcctivcness of the mark-to-market accounting rules. 
Either: 
1) The rules produced a correct. very low valuation of toxic assets. The rules wen: just the 
messenger. telling market participants how bad things wen:. 
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2) The rules did not produce a correct valuation of toxic assets. This view holds that th~ rule 
itself is responsible for unnecessarily devaluing fundamentally sound assets based on 
unrelated or arbitrary market fluctuation. 
A third option, the option selected by the Fin:mcial Accounting Standards Bourd when 
defining Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. is that the rules sometimes result in a correct 
valuation and sometimes do not. However, the purpose at hand is to examine a specific 
application of the rules to the MBSs and other securities behind the financial crisis. Therefore, 
the rules must he dctcnnined to he either cll"ective or not in this highly specific case. 
111e ~!feet of Mark-to-Market on the Bailout Approach 
If the first choice is correct. then the toxic assets themselves an: the problem. The bailout 
should focus on the institutional approach if such is the (.;asc. This is because i) buying the 
troubled assets themselves would he a had investment for taxpayers. and ii) the institutions 
themselves \\'Ould still be salvageable if the assets arr: able to he isolated as the problem. The 
institutional approach would provide funding to critical financial institutions in the economy that 
have been devastated by fundamentally devalued assets. Helping these institutions \vould be a 
potentially viable solution. because the institutim1s themselves have future potential for viability 
and profitability. Helping them during di!licult times could theoretically salvage their potential 
value and prevent further economic decay. 
If the second choice is correct, then the toxic assets themselves arc NOT the problem: the 
rule that gave them an incorrectly low valuation on balance sheets is thc problem. To remedy this 
problem. the rule must be disposed of and the assets approach to the bailout must be taken. The 
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assets approach demands a focus on providing financial assistance to assets themselves. The 
Tcm1 Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility related to quantitative easing in March. 2009, and 
Public-Private Investment Program are examples of this method. If this approach is correct, then 
assets will gradually regain value in the markets since the assets already possess fundamental 
value. This occurs when the lender of last resort is willing to support the asset values by making 
and holding a purchase. 
The bailout originally vacillated between both approaches. In March. 2009. TARP itself 
took an assets based approach. This does not negate the institutional approach from the original 
loans to AIG and others. It also docs not fit with the ongoing institutional approach followed by 
the assistance which continues to be dispersed to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
Another factor has been added with the automakcr's bailout. Tbis bailout was a clear 
institutional approach move to an industry outside the core of the financial crisis. This evinced an 
expansion of the institutional approach criteria to be defined as too economically important to 
fail and having future potential for profitability. 
The American Recovery legislation is arguably within the broad framework of the 
institutional approach, at least as far as its etTccts strictly on TARP and the financial crisis is 
concerned. This is not to say that it did not have other purposes. such as helping American 
citizens economically. Instead, it is just an analysis of how its economic etlects affected the 
Jinancial crisis proper. With a view toward the necessity and ongoing profitability of the 
American people, infrastructure. and economy overall. the American Recovery bailout attempted 
to reduce the impact of the fundamentally toxic securities by improving the overall economic 
health and l!nthusiasm for investing of the individual Americans who make up the markets. The 
American Recovery Act was touted as a bailout of"Main Street." not Wall Street. 
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Whether mark-to-market accounting was to blam~ for part of the crisis depends on the 
correct answer to a single question. Which approach to the bailout is chosen also depends on the 
correct answer to the ~ame question. 'Ibis is the question of whether the roxie assets had 
reasonably hi~hfundamenral value or not. If they had real value. then mark-to-market 
accounting is to blame and the institutional approach will work. If they had little or no real value. 
then mark-to-market accounting is right and the asset approach \Viii work. 
Do the assets have fundamental value? The next step toward answering this question is 
that of detem1ining the answer to our fundamental value issue. The following appendices on 
credit default swaps and naked put options address the issue of valuing the MBSs and other 
securities behind the crisis. 
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Appendix II: Credit Default Swaps 
What was the nature of the credit default swaps that insured the Ml3S$ (mortgage backed 
securities), CDOs (collateralized debt obligation). and other toxic assets that created the 
background of the tinancial crisis? These CDSs transferred risk from holder!-. of the securities to 
large insurers like AIG Our search is for the fundamental value of the underlying assets. This 
fundamental value had high potential to be lost or overlooked within or because of the crl!dit 
dcl~mlt swap risk transfer transactions. 
"Credit default swaps" is a nice piece of financial institution jargon that immediately 
causes one to think of the concept of interest rate swaps. Insurance rate swaps arc contractual 
transfers of interest payments between financial institutions based on interest rates in the 
economy. Essentially, they allow financial institutions to swap excess interest payments that 
could be received for i:L'i'\Urancc that should rates move against them. their losses will be reduced 
by someone else's excess interest receivables. 
Credit dd~mlt swaps. though similar in tem1inology. arc entirely ditlcrent from interest 
rate swaps. CDSs allow one party to "swap" its acceptance of virtually unlimited risk of default 
on a security (meaning that the value of the security could go to zero) for receipt of a one-time or 
rccei\'ablc payment of money. CDSs arc a risk transfer. hut they are ill-dctincd if one thinks of 
them in the same terms as interest rate swaps. Much more potential loss is transferred with 
CDSs. 
Arc COSs better classified as insurance'? After all. insurance was the main business of 
AIG. the major seller ofCDSs. The relevant characteristics of true insurance arc: 
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1) A risk tramfl'r 
2) Tntnsfcr of a pure, not <J speculative, risk 
3) A lack of catastrophic loss potential 
4) An actuarhtlly calculable premium ha,Scd on past loss c~posurc and the l•m of large 
number 
Which of these categories do CDSs fall into? 
1) It has been established that a clear risk transfer exists 
2) This criteria is met at first. Pure risk docs exist if the mortgages have already been 
made and the availability of the CDS docs not influence the issuance of the mortgages or the 
derivative security. However. moral haz.ard comes into play here. lf the CDSs availability 1.:aus.:~ 
n..:w risk to be undertaken. then speculative risk has bc.:n incurred. In other words. if the insured 
takes on more risk because the insurance is available. then moral hazard threatens the insurer's 
position. When mortgages began to be issued more widely to subprime borrowers, speculative 
risk thrcatcnl.'d the CDS concept. 
The profitability of the insurer \Vas the sam\.' initially whether the CDSs were issued I) 
early in the game to legitimate borrowers who could alford their mortgages, or 2) speculatively 
later to substandard borrowers \\'ho had been solicited by mortgage initiation companies who 
turned around and sold their mortgages as MBSs to be insured by CDSs. ln other words. by the 
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time subprimc lending had become the profit driver of the mortgage industry. the CDS insurers 
\\l:rc already deeply involved in speculative risk. 
3) Catastrophic loss potential docs exist because ofthc effects of interest rates. Many 
mortgaged backed derivative securities were issued based on adjustable rate mortgage contracts. 
Adjustable rate ARM rnortgagcs were issued when rates were low. Because of mortgage 
amorti7 ..ation principles. even a slight jump in interest rates can dramatically increase the monthly 
payments on ARM mortgages. Thus, a catastrophe can potentially occur for CDS issuers if 
interest rate~ rise substantially and many borrowers default simultaneously. 
4) The premium was not actuarially calculable ba'\ed on loss potential. The relevant form 
ofCDSs was conceived by AfG's most respected minds around 2005. MBSs \ .. ere a rising 
concept at that time. There was simply not enough loss data historically to calculate a premium 
actuarially. A similar situation is encountered by any nev; type of insurance~ for example. auto 
insurance '""hen cars were tirst widely used. [92] 
Second, \\as the law of large numbers at play here? For the law to be satisfied. the 
population must be large enough that any sample insured by the insurer experiences losses in 
independent, predictably frequent intervals. There \Vere certainly enough loss exposures units 
insured. However, did they represent a population whose losses would occur independently of 
one another with predictable intervals? It has already bt:cn shown that default tendencies could 
potentially move together based on insurance rates. This catastrophic potential overrides the 
large number of exposure units. Thus, the law of large numbers is indirectly violated since the 
population insured moves together, taking nn the characteristic of a single loss exposure unit. 
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Appendix Ill: Naked Puts 
What other financial instrument is possibly comparable to a CDS? One comparable 
financial instrument is a naked put option. Put options arc a derivative security that allows the 
purchaser to force sale of the underlying instrument to the seller for a fixed price at a tixed date. 
Put options arc often settled in cash rather than securities delivery. IJccausc of this, they take on a 
quasi-insurance function for institutions that purchase them to hedge underlying securities 
against risk of price decreases. The options play a speculative role for sellers who write them. 
and 'they take an especially speculative role for sellers who write them naked (without having a 
position in the underlying security). Naked put options, from the seller's point of view, an.: 
similar to credit default swaps. 
A description ofthc characteristics of naked put options and CDSs in comparison to the 
characteristics of insurance follows: 
1) They involve a risk transfer (quasi-insurance, meaning they do not meet the 
qualifications of true insurance. but are still used to hedge risk) 
2) Pure risk is involved if the options arc written with a position in the underlying 
security. If the institution selling the put has a position in or desires to acquire the security. its 
risk is in pure form since it is exposed to the underlying security. Speculative risk exists if the 
options arc written naked. In this case. there is no concern for the underlying security. but simply 
:;R 1 P a g. 1.' 
speculation on its \'alue. Risk that did not heforc exist is created for the seller. The clwncc is one 
of profiting if speculation is correct. much like gamhling in a casino. 
3) Catastrophic losses arc possihlc with nah:d put writing. The options expose the seller 
to risk of losing the entire value of the underlying option. That is to say, if the underlying 
security becomes worthless. then the option writer must still huy it at full price as specified hy 
the option contract. The more options arc sold. the morL' catastrophic the loss potential becomes. 
4) Actuarially calculable premiums arc diilicult to detcm1ine for options. Models such as 
the Black-Scholcs Option Pricing Model exist, hut these models only provide an estimate of 
value. Ultimately, markets dctem1inc option premiums. Historical loss exposures an.: not very 
useful to detennining optimal premiums in general. Data on historical volatility is frequently 
availahlc for options hut has little predictive rc.levancc for determining the value of the risk 
portion of the optimal premium from an actuarial standpoint. The law oflargc numhcrs is also 
irrelevant to option writing. Options arc regularly \Hitten on thinly traded securities. 
Naked put options and CDSs share a similar lack of each of these characteristics except 
for risk transfer. The only real dificrcncc is that C:DSs do not involve a right to sell a security, 
hut simply a right to receive the same amount of money that would have hccn received had the 
security hccn sold at a contract price. CDS insurers like AIG agreed to pay nearly unlimited 
losses if a defined .. credit event" should occur. such as def"tlult. The ditl~rcncc hccomes nothing 
more than a halancc sheet ditTcrcncc. Whether the security itself is transferred or not~if all the 
risk is tnmst~rred th!! !->amc result is reached. Just as many put options go unexercised. so most 
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CDSs will never require payment on a loss, in theory. The problem with that theory is that if 
CDSs insure securities with a high statistical correlation of default. a CDS insurer could be 
exposed to a system risk that a 'vvritcr of puts may not experience. Naked puts and CDSs arc hoth 
paths to the same result of a state function. [281 
The resulting situation for AIG created a large insurance firm with a halance sheet tilled 
with the equivalent of naked put options. This is an abhorrent situation for any financial 
institution that must claim an ability to pass a solvency or risk test. AIG and other CDS sellers 
seriously compromised their positions as viable ongoing concern~ by saddling themselves with 
this risk. 
Why would AJG and other CDS insurers take on the enormous risk of these CDS 
transactions? These swaps allow the seller to record huge inOows of cash payments anu 
receivables for an insurance transaction that may extend over many years to come (such as 15 or 
30 years for MBSs). There is a short-tem1 incentive to issue CDSs, if one ignores the long-tenn 
risk associated with selling them. This is especially true if CDSs in general arc not recognized by 
investors or regulators as possessing a high level of risk. 
Appendix IV: Fundamental Values 
What docs all this mean for the fundamental value of the underlying securities, our 
original question? To answer this. it is crucial to know the definition of value as it relates to the 
mortgage derivative securities. For the purposes of a mortgage, the value is the stream of 
payments that make up the mortgage's amorti;.ation schedule and prepayments if they exist. 
Should these payments be suspended. the mortgage is in default. The underlying security to the 
mortgage (the house) becomes the source of value. In this case. the measure of value is home 
prices. For an MBS. the sources of value arc the same. since the aggregate payments make up the 
mortgage. So far, home prices and payment stn:ams arc the sources of value for a mortgage and 
an MBS. 
However, the situation changes dramatically when the MBS is insured by a CDS. The 
ahility to sell the MBS in a free market hinges on the risk being transferred to a CDS. In other 
words, there is a large valuation ditlcrcncc between selling an uninsured and an insured MBS. 
An insured MBS v.ill have a far more stable price ~.:unc than an uninsured MBS. An insured 
l\1BS is roughly equivalent to a hand, since the payment stream is guaranteed by a large 
company. Indeed. insured MBSs including those sold and guaranteed by Fannie Mac and Freddie 
Mac historically sold for a high price hascd on this very logic. [75] 
What happens when the insurance on the ~1HS goes into default? The answer is :.1 
financial crisis. This is exactly what happened in September. 2008. when AJG (and other similar 
finns) l~1ilcd because of the catastrophic CDS losses incurred. With mark-to-nwrkct accounting, 
MBSs on halance sheets all over the U.S. plummeted in value when the disappearance of CDS 
insurance occurred in the wake of AIU and similar firms· failures. 
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Thus, the source of value for an insured MI3S is dependent on three factors. not two. 
These three factors are, in order of ability to collect: 
1) Stream of payments (less prepalmcnts) 
2) The 3\'aih•bility of quasi-insurance 
3) The stream of payments 
~)The house or real estate value. 
Why is the stream of payments mentioned twice? It is the primary source of collection of 
value. but if it defaults. the quasi-insurance is next. When the insurance defaults, the original 
MBS holder goes back to whatever stream of payments remains to collect whatever value is 
possible. If the situation then leads to a default. one is all the v.·ay back to the house with which 
the mortgage originated. This home ·s value on the market is the tina! source of value for the 
MBS. 
This research is now closer to answering the question about what fundamental value the 
toxic securities have in the midst of the financial carnage. There arc three places to look for 
value. As far as the quasi-insurance credit default swapping goes. its sellers arc only able to 
guarantee their products about as much as an inexperienced speculative investor with a little 
capital to bring to the table can guarantee the naked puts he writes. Thus. the second source of 
value on our list docs not look that promising. 
If the stream of payments has already defaulted enough to bankrupt the quasi-insurance 
peddling party. then one should not rely exceedingly on that same stream of payments for a 
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source of value. Real estate values plummeted 1n the financial crisis. so they arc not a good 
source of value either. Remember the accounting principle that would require a markdown of 
assets at this point-that old culprit called ''mark-to-market" accounting. The mark-to-market 
accounting rules match well with the result of applying the three fundamental valuation 
principles to the assets in consideration. 
Appendix V: Other Bailout Activities of Note 
In 2008 and 2009, stimulus money was in the process ofbcing distributed to financial 
institutions. At the same time. bailouts were being created and expanded to include automakcrs. 
working Americans, and motorists who sold their '·clunker" automobiles. Consequently it is 
diflicult to isolate TARP. Instead, one must consider the family ofTARP, the bailouts inspired by 
TARP, and the expansion and revisions to these bailouts. Following is a brit:f summary of the 
main events aiTccting the bailout family. 
Automakcn.' Bailout: In December, 2008. Congress loaned roughly 17 billion dollars to 
General Motors and Chrysler. In February, 2009, roughly $22 billion more was loaned under the 
Obama administration. GM went on to post record losses of 30.9 billion in 2008. In April. 
Chrysler filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In June, GM filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy as well. 
The US Treasury receive-d an agreement to take possession of 60.8 percent of GM's stock as part 
ofthc bankruptcy. f65] 
Fannie Mal' and Freddie Mac: These quasi-governmental agencies continued to request 
bailout funds in March, May. August. and November of 2009. In December 2009, the Treasury 
removed the former limits of $400 billion on aid to Fannie and Freddie. The bailout of Fannie 
Mac and Freddie Mac has taken on a life of its own. separating itself from TARP proper. As of 
March 2012, fannie Mac had posted losses of $2.4 billion in Q4 2011, prompting it to ask for an 
additional $4.6 billion in funds from the government. [72] 
J•uhlk-Prh'~ttc lnnstmcnt Program: This program partnered with the Federal 
Rcservc·s Tem1 Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). It began in March. 2009. and was 
intended to provide renewed liquidity to markets where toxic assets from the financial crisis had 
been traded. The plan dealt both with loans hdd directly on hank 's balance sheets as derivative 
securities. This program remained closely tied to TARP. but the potential to purchase securities 
was leveraged. Asset purchasing may have reached levels as high as $500 billion ur $1 trillion 
with help from TALF and private investing. 
American Rccovcn· and Reirwc tmcnt Act of 2009: This act is commonly known as 
.. the stimulus:· difTcrcntiating it from the bailout. However. it was born out of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act and TARP. Congress touted it as a continuation of the Keynesian 
tradition of increasing government spending during a recession, and as a "bailout" to average 
Americans. comparable to what TARP did for commercial finance. The value of this act as 
originally passed is $787 billion. These funds were to be procured from and are closely linked 
v. ith the tederal budget. Specific expenditures included the American Opportunity credit for 
college students, food stamp program expansion~ home buyer tax aid. and appropriations for 
Amtrak. The largest portion of spending was allocated to ta.x breaks. State and local govcmmcnt 
fiscal aid. infrastntcturc investment. and health can: were other major categoric.s. The 
Congressional Budget Ollice released a report that the entire original $787 billion figure would 
eventually be added to federal budget deficits until 2019.[21] [271 
The expenditures of this act expanded federal spending dramatically. This expansion 
began in fiscal year 2009 and continued through 2010. The American Recovery Act is 
indisputably a throwback to the Keynesian ism of the Great Depression. This revives, in the 
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context of the modem economy. the old Monetarist/Keyn~sian debate about fiscal policy during 
recession. [85] 
Car Allowan('c l{ehate S\'Stem: This program is unonicially known a~ Cash for 
Clunkers. It allowed certain older cars to he traded in for new Detroit made models. The older 
cars, which were said to be inefficient and environmentally detrimental. were turned over to the 
govemment and destroyed. This program was passed and begun in July, 2009, and ended in 
August of that year. Costing $3 billion. the policy was not directly related to TARP or the 
American Recovery Act. It was an independent program falling under a broad congressional goal 
of "stimulus." It cost taxpayers approximately $24.000 per additional car traded in, adding the 
perception of government waste surrounding bailout and stimulus activity. 1!~6] 
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